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Narrating Europe’s Migration and Refugee ‘Crisis’ 
 
Abstract 
 
It is very clear – as many journalists covering the unfolding migration and refugee crisis have 
pointed out – that geography lies at the heart of the events taking place in Europe and the 
Mediterranean. It is a story of borders and routes, of distance and proximity, and of location 
and accessibility. The role of (re-)bordering has been fundamental in states’ attempts to 
‘manage’ and ‘control’ the refugee and migrant flows and, in this respect, we observe a return 
to the more traditional practices of bordering – physical barriers and personnel-heavy security 
controls – rather than the previous processes of ‘externalizing’ and ‘internalizing’ border 
management. In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans the external border of the 
European ‘fortress’ has been prised open, whilst the free-movement ethos of the Schengen 
area has been compromized by EU states’ reactions to the large-scale movement of migrants 
and refugees and recent acts of terrorism. In this introductory paper we bring a critical 
geopolitical lens into play in order to understand the European, regional and global power 
geometries at work, and we critically examine the political and media rhetoric around the 
various discursive constructions of the migrant/refugee ‘crisis’, including both the negative 
and the Islamophobic utterances of some European leaders and the game-changing iconicity 
of certain media images. 
 
Keywords: Europe, refugee and migration ‘crisis’, migrant fatalities, legitimation, political 
geography, European Union policy 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 19 April 2015 around 800 people were drowned in the Mediterranean Sea south of 
Lampedusa – the small Sicilian island – when the hopelessly overcrowded and unseaworthy 
boat in which they were trying to reach Europe capsized. This tragic accident, the most 
significant loss of life in a single such incident ever recorded, marks the beginning of a 
narrative of crisis associated with the movement of people to Europe. Unfortunately, none of 
this is new. Over the last few decades, undocumented migration, meaning travel organized 
specifically to avoid the institutionalized system of state regulation, has become increasingly 
common across the Mediterranean. These dangerous journeys have often resulted in tragedy, 
yet this past year has been perceived differently. 
Since the 19 April tragedy, continued fatal accidents and growing numbers of people 
crossing the Mediterranean have fueled a language of crisis associated with this 
undocumented migration. Yet the unease of this ‘migration crisis’ is not primarily caused by 
migration itself, but by repeated evidence that the member-states of the European Union are 
unable to respond effectively. This introductory paper, like the rest of the contributions in this 
special issue, seeks to examine the origins and nature of this ‘crisis’. As Lindley argues, the 
language of ‘crisis’ is powerful, indicating something that is both anormal and bad (2014: 2). 
In these terms, the current crisis is not one of migration, nor even of refugees or humanitarian 
action, as others have argued (UNHCR 2015) but, rather, using the term of Habermas (1988), 
one of ‘legitimation’.  
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Habermas’ classic work (published in German in 1973 and in English in 1988) 
examines the crisis of capitalism, which he argues may be of four closely related crisis types: 
economy, rationality, legitimation and motivation. All rely on the central theme of 
legitimation, which highlights the requirement of the modern liberal state to be seen as 
governing in the interest of citizens, beyond the formal democratic mandate of government. 
In order to gain the continued consensus of citizens, state administrative institutions must be 
perceived as good, just, and governing in the broader interest. A specific crisis of legitimation 
is associated with socio-cultural implications of state involvement in the economy. A 
legitimation crisis results from a widespread perception that state institutions have failed in 
normative terms. 
We feel that this diagnosis captures the current situation in Europe particularly well. 
Although the ‘crisis’ is widely expressed in terms of migration, it relates much more broadly 
to the perceived legitimacy of state institutions to perform the increasingly wide range of 
administrative functions that are necessary to manage the complex realities of state 
facilitation of the market economy. This increasingly takes place at the European Union (EU) 
level. Indeed the EU’s responsibility for coordinating border control at the ‘external’ borders 
of Europe1 is directly related to the gradual suppression of internal controls, originating in the 
1985 Schengen Agreement, associated with the expansion of the European Single Market. 
The expansion of the EU’s remit into migration management and border control, which is 
now seriously critiqued by both left and right, is therefore initially a result of the expansion of 
the state and supra-state’s role in managing the economy. This introductory paper sets the 
analysis of this legitimation crisis into the context of the entire special issue. It falls into three 
main sections which examine, in turn, the ways in which migration data are presented, the 
distinctiveness of the current crisis, and the central role of political geography in explaining 
it. A final section overviews the remaining papers in the special issue.  
 
Characterizing the ‘crisis’: difficulties with data 
 
Although the ‘migration crisis’ is about much more than migration, the ways in which the 
‘movement of people’ (to employ a broader and more neutral term) is measured, categorized 
and understood is undeniably an important contributory factor. The measurement of 
movement is extremely challenging and subsequent categorization of that movement is 
inevitably highly political (Collyer and de Haas 2012). This starts with the choice of the 
information to be measured.  
The significance and frequency of fatal accidents is perhaps the most significant 
concern underlying the crisis narrative, yet it is also one of the most difficult areas in which 
to collect accurate information. In any fatal accident there is a close link between accuracy of 
information, identification of those killed and tracing family members, all closely related to 
basic human respect for the dead. It is the lack of this respect which aggravates the tragedy of 
fatalities of undocumented migrants. Data on the number of dead in the incident on 19 April 
2015, like all such tragedies, are still approximate. Only 28 people survived and 24 bodies 
were recovered, so estimates of the number of dead are based on survivors’ testimonies of the 
number of people on board when the boat left Libya. These vary from 700 to 900. The 
UNHCR (2015) cites a figure of ‘over 600’; the figure of 800 that we have cited comes from 
a first-hand interview by the BBC with a group of survivors (BBC News 23 April 2015). 
Such variation would be unimaginable in any other transportation disaster. It is a powerful 
illustration of the diminished value of human life. It also undermines the potential to use 
fatalities as a measure of severity in these situations.  
The Missing Migrants project, managed by the International Organization for 
Migration, has become the most widely cited authority on these statistics (IOM 2016). 
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Despite the tremendous uncertainties surrounding the information, their figure of 3,770 
fatalities in the Mediterranean in 2015 has gained a level of authority by repetition and is 
widely used in both media reports and academic analysis. This figure is clearly unacceptable 
and is one of the most significant concerns driving the humanitarian argument for crisis. Yet, 
given the larger number of crossings of the Mediterranean, it is not dramatically different 
from the previous decade. Fargues and Di Bartolomeo (2015) conducted an analysis of the 
risk of dying at sea on a Mediterranean crossing which has fluctuated between 1 and 4 
percent since the substantial undocumented migration in the Mediterranean began in 2001. 
A second widely cited statistical measure is the number of people who have entered 
Europe without authorization. Undocumented migration is, by its very definition, impossible 
to count accurately, though that proviso never appears in media commentaries. There are two 
widely used proxies for undocumented migration to Europe: quarterly data from Frontex (the 
European border control agency) on ‘detections of illegal border crossings at the EU’s 
external borders’ (Frontex 2016), and the total number of asylum applications registered in 
the European Union. Both statistics have been widely cited as if they were the reality of the 
situation, but they are approximate indicators, at best, of the numbers of people arriving.  
Frontex is initially clear in the description of its central statistical measure, though the 
way the data are then presented and used, particularly by media sources down the line, 
camouflages this clarity considerably. It is important to highlight two important features of 
data on ‘detections of illegal border crossings at the EU’s external borders’. First, it relates 
only to detections. The number of individuals who cross a border undetected is unknowable, 
so the accuracy of the measure basically relates to the effectiveness of surveillance 
operations. On maritime borders, surveillance is relatively accurate but, on land borders 
without sophisticated surveillance mechanisms, undetected crossings are likely to be higher. 
Second, this measure relates only to border crossings, not to numbers of individuals. This is 
likely to be a much larger discrepancy, since the same individuals may be recorded several 
times. A journey from Turkey to Germany, for example, involves an entry into Greece, then a 
crossing out of the EU into Macedonia and a second crossing of an external EU border into 
Croatia or Hungary. Nando Sigona (2015) highlighted this practice in a publicized exchange 
with Frontex, estimating that, if these figures are interpreted as individuals entering Europe, 
they may lead to as much as double counting.  
Using asylum statistics as a proxy for undocumented entry to the EU is equally 
problematic. According to Eurostat (2016), in 2015 there were just over 1.3 million claims 
for asylum registered in the 28 member-states of the EU. Given the widespread fingerprinting 
of asylum applicants through the EURODAC database, it is more certain that each 
application was registered by a different individual. Still, there is no record of how these 
individuals entered the EU, nor how long they had been there before registering an asylum 
claim, so it would be a mistake to interpret this as the number of people who entered the EU 
in that year. It is also a mistake to interpret these data historically. The previous peak in 
asylum applications in the EU occurred in 1992, when just over 672,000 applications were 
received (Eurostat 2016). This has fueled widespread reports that the EU received double the 
previous maximum number of asylum applications in 2015. Yet, in 1992, there were only 15 
countries in the EU, compared to the current 28. Although most of the 13 newest members 
receive very few asylum applications, Hungary received the second-highest number after 
Germany. The 15 states that were members of the EU in 1992 received just over 1 million 
asylum applications in 2015. This is significantly higher than the 672,000 for 1992, but well 
short of double the previous peak – in fact it represents an increase of 49 percent.  
Each of these statistical measures has been used as if they were much more accurate 
than they really are. They have also been used in ways which exaggerate the significance of 
recent movements compared to historical periods. This is certainly not to say that migration is 
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objectively irrelevant, but the nature of the presentation of the movement of people is an 
important element in how the crisis has been framed. This has informed the regularly updated 
political response, which is always introduced in terms of changing strategies of migration 
management. However, these have ultimately drawn attention away from the underlying 
issues of legitimation at a European level.  
 
The legitimation crisis and the ‘European response’ 
 
The European Union has not experienced anything approaching the scale of the current 
refugee situation in Lebanon, or even Turkey or Jordan, since the Second World War. 
Displacement in Europe during and immediately after the war motivated the construction of 
the global regime of refugee protection, founded on the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees. There have been other significant arrivals in Europe, notably the 1991 
movement from Albania to Italy and Greece, and other displacements across the Western 
Balkans from 1992 onwards. Although those displacements are far short of movements 
elsewhere in the world, they were similar to the situation experienced in the EU in 2015. 
Significantly, the European Union coped quite successfully with these earlier refugee and 
migration episodes. In 1992, Germany received 438,191 applications for asylum, only 
marginally fewer than the 476,510 received in 2015. Although some institutions were 
undoubtedly stretched, there was nothing like the current rhetoric of ‘crisis’ or developing 
right-wing activism.  
The panicked response to the 2015 ‘crisis’ contrasts significantly with these earlier 
events. Certainly, nothing so bold as the 1951 Convention has even been discussed. Indeed 
any mention of the Convention by European policymakers involves suggestions to roll back 
the protections which it guarantees, and refugee advocates have wisely steered this off the 
policy agenda. What, then, distinguishes the current legitimation crisis from earlier concerns 
around mass arrivals? Four possible features of the current European response are apparent:  
  the withdrawal of the state from all forms of public provision;   the broader economic and political crisis experienced in the EU, particularly since 2008;  the re-imposition of controls at borders within Europe; and   the change in the nature of migrants’ and refugees’ journeys to reach EUrope.  
 
Each of these has exacerbated the sense of a crisis of legitimation within the EU and, 
although the focus on migration has sought to redirect attention from this broader crisis, the 
continued failure of policy responses has only intensified. 
Neoliberalism involves an extension of the role of state institutions in the management 
of the economy and a simultaneous reduction of state involvement in all forms of social 
provision (Harvey 2007). These two processes are central to what Habermas (1988) referred 
to as an economic crisis and a legitimation crisis. They are closely related and help to explain 
why the 2015 mass arrival has been framed as a crisis, whereas similar events over the last 
few decades have not. As state institutions responsible for basic services to support new 
arrivals have failed, citizen activists have frequently stepped in to fill the gap. This has been 
particularly apparent in countries such as Greece and Italy, which were particularly hard hit 
by the dramatic reductions in state expenditure associated with the 2008 financial crisis. It 
has also been the case in Germany, where volunteers have come forward to help with 
reception activities and language support, and even in the UK where, despite the very small 
number of arrivals, there has been substantial mobilization to provide support to the few 
thousand destitute refugees camped outside the Channel ports of Calais and Dunkirk. The 
provision of services is not the only migration-related activity that state institutions have 
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slowly withdrawn from. The process of border control itself is now very significantly 
outsourced to private companies providing equipment and services (Andersson 2014). 
International coordination of border control activities is undertaken by EU agencies, 
particularly Frontex, but also Europol (Carrera and Guild 2016).  
The changing role of EU institutions is the second important contribution to the current 
legitimation crisis. Over the last few decades the European Union has become much more 
involved in both the broader management of the economy, through the common market, and 
the coordination and regulation of associated social provision. The entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 also significantly extended the role of EU institutions in 
managing and legislating around border control, and marked the final incorporation of all 
legislation related to the Schengen area of free movement into EU treaties. The additional 
responsibilities of EU institutions became much more apparent during the 2008 financial 
crisis, which generated widespread resentment of the EU amongst EU citizens, particularly 
those in the countries the most affected. The limited contact between most European citizens 
and EU institutions has allowed national governments to avoid responsibility for unpopular 
decisions, blaming them directly on the EU. This tactic has only exacerbated the legitimacy 
crisis, fueling an impression of the fading power of national governments whereas, in many 
cases, the EU has provided national governments with an ideal forum for passing legislation 
that would otherwise be difficult to pass. This process has been referred to as ‘venue 
shopping’, and it is particularly apparent in the field of migration (Guiraudon 2000). In the 
UK, for example, the current government has repeatedly framed its failure to reduce net 
migration as a result of the policy of free movement within the EU, failing to highlight that 
UK citizens are some of the greatest beneficiaries of this policy. This fuels opposition to the 
EU at the time of the very genuine risk of the first departure of a member-state.2  
The final two characteristics of the current legitimacy crisis focus more particularly on 
the changing practices of border control and on the evolving nature of movement itself. Over 
the last decade or so, analysis of border control has begun to consider the border as a process, 
rather than as a linear location. Individuals wishing to cross a border must pass through a 
diffuse array of processes that are physically dispersed and often managed remotely. Yet, at 
the same time, border walls and fences have become increasingly common as material 
realities. Recent analysis in The Economist (2016) highlighted that 40 countries have built 
new border walls since the end of the Cold War; 30 of those were constructed since 9/11 and 
15 in 2015 alone. Of these latter 15, eight were in Europe. As Reece Jones (2012) has argued, 
such concentration of often hugely expensive constructions cannot be explained entirely by 
their often limited effectiveness at deterring crossing. Crawley (this issue) uses the excellent 
example of the publicity campaign for the new border controls in Hungary, which involves 
posters printed in Hungarian. This clearly highlights how policies are not designed to address 
migration or migrants, but to calm the concerns of electorates. They are essentially costly 
performances of statecraft. Further problems arise when the policies prove ineffective at 
reducing migration, as they so often do. This heightens the impression that the state is out of 
control and further exacerbates the legitimacy crisis.  
These three developments – the ongoing neoliberal scaling back of the state, the 
continued impacts of the financial crisis in the EU, and the more performative approach to 
border control – are all interrelated with developments in the processes of migration 
themselves. Over the last few decades the geography of migration to and within Europe has 
changed very considerably (King 2002), and these changes are ongoing, involving new routes 
and access-points. The growing preponderance of dangerous overland journeys is a 
significant element of this change. As it has become increasingly difficult, and therefore 
expensive, to gain access to Europe directly by air without authorization, longer land 
journeys have developed as an alternative, even before the southern or eastern shores of the 
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Mediterranean are reached. These journeys are typically not linear. They result from a 
succession of attempts to gain greater safety and security, with often long stops in locations 
on the way in a characteristic fragmented pattern (Collyer 2012). Fragmented migration 
involves journeys that are not directly from a point of origin and only appear as journeys to 
anywhere in particular in retrospect. This more complex geography of migration has 
significant implications for control and regulation. Individuals are typically not traveling 
directly from their country of citizenship, so changes in the political and economic conditions 
in those countries will have limited influence on their further patterns of travel. This new 
geography of migration has further impacts on any explanation of the crisis.  
 
Explaining the ‘crisis’: the role of political geography  
 
The observation that geography is central to the current crisis has become commonplace in 
media discussions. Newspapers have published many maps of access routes and border 
regions, and journalists and news reporters have repeatedly stated in their dispatches from the 
field that ‘geography is vital’ in understanding the unfolding dynamics of migrants’ and 
refugees’ constantly shifting routes and border crossings. It is true, of course, that the South 
and East of Europe have received larger numbers of migrants and refugees than the rest of 
Europe. This is a banal interpretation of political geography, since it is fairly obvious that 
migrants and refugees crossing from Turkey or Libya will arrive in large numbers in Greece 
or Italy. It is also not entirely accurate, since it does not explain why people come in the first 
place, or why Germany received far more asylum applications than any other member-state 
in 2015; nor does it account for the astonishing inventiveness of refugees who seek new 
opportunities whenever more-established opportunities fade. In August 2015, stories began to 
circulate of Syrian refugees crossing the Russian–Norwegian border. The Independent 
reported that, since border regulations prohibited crossing on foot or as a passenger, 151 
individuals crossed on bicycles in the year to August 2015 (Independent 31 August 2015). 
More-substantial interpretations of political geography involve the central geopolitical nature 
of EU migration governance and the perspectives of relevant migrant and refugee groups. 
These two points help to highlight the nature of the legitimation crisis.  
Both Crawley and Lulle (this issue) argue that the crisis is a geopolitical one rooted in 
more-fundamental divisions in Europe. This is certainly true but the geopolitical approach 
applies particularly clearly to strategies of migration governance at EU level, which have 
traditionally failed. Bojadžijev and Mezzadra (2015) argue that it is a crisis of European 
migration policies and there is much to substantiate this view. The Dublin Convention, 
incorporated most recently (2013) into EU legislation as the Dublin III Regulation,3 is a 
prime example. Dublin-related legislation was designed to ensure that each asylum-seeker 
would have his or her claim considered by one member-state, but only one. The Regulation 
seeks to identify which member-state should hear that claim, drawing on a slightly modified 
formulation in which states bearing the greatest responsibility for an individual’s presence on 
EU territory are obliged to consider the claim. This system has resulted in highly regressive 
movements of individuals seeking refuge in the North and West of the continent, where 
arrival is the most difficult, towards the South and East, where there is the least money to pay 
for an effective response. In an interesting sleight of geopolitical hand, the legislation treats 
the EU as 28 member-states for the purposes of the eventual location of the refugee but only 
as a single state for the purposes of complying with the 1951 Convention. Although the 
Dublin principle of country of first arrival has long been criticized, it is significant that this 
system finally began to collapse in August 2015, when Germany suspended all returns of 
Syrians to Greece under the Dublin convention (Dernbach 2015). 
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There is another way that geography – in its elemental forms of spatial analysis of 
point, line, and area (cf. Cole and King 1968) – enters into the mechanics of migratory 
movements and of control over those movements. The Dublin legislation is part of a shift 
from point to areal forms of migration management that has driven EU migration legislation 
over the last few decades. Most international migration is regulated through point forms of 
control, at ports or airports. The increasingly rapid construction of border walls or fences 
marks a change to a line-based system, where the border itself is reinforced along its entire 
length. Finally, systems of control have moved to areas, which may be maritime zones – as in 
the case of the Mediterranean – and extending beyond the EU, as in the discussion of 
‘partnerships’ with neighboring non-EU countries. On the other side of the areal control coin, 
the combination of Schengen and Dublin seeks to facilitate and regulate movement within the 
EU. Each of these different systems of point, line, and area has different implications for 
strategies to control migration and for the EU’s relationship with its neighbors. Point is the 
easiest to manage and this is the form of control that the EU’s response in the Mediterranean 
has taken most recently, through the establishment of ‘hotspots’ – centers that provide 
administrative support to new arrivals.  
More-individual calculations of geopolitics inform the origins and continued 
fragmented movements of migrants and refugees. The levels of despair and hopelessness that 
many people report in relation to their future prospects in their place of origin highlight a 
particular geopolitics of home. In one of the most powerful testaments to the current situation 
– Warsan Shire’s 2015 poem ‘Home’ – Shire writes ‘no one would leave home/unless home 
chased you to the shore’. The rich geographical literature on geographies of home (Blunt and 
Dowling 2006) highlights situations in which the ideal of home is undermined, resulting in 
displacement. The journey provides an alternative ideal which allows individuals to replace 
this geopolitics of home with what Erciyes (this issue) refers to as a ‘geopolitics of hope’. 
Hope, for anyone traveling in such hazardous ways, is located in the imagined destination. 
The processes by which this hope is generated, the implications of the fragmented journeys 
that it generates, and the consequences for the broader narrative of ‘crisis’ in Europe are an 
important focus for research which we explore in this special issue.  
 
What role for analysis? The papers in the special issue 
 
We round off this scene-setting paper by walking readers through the papers which follow: 
an appropriate metaphor since most of the journeys undertaken by the migrants and refugees 
themselves are made on foot. Even for the able-bodied, these journeys are made under great 
duress, in extremes of heat and cold, in snow, wind and rain; they are even more challenging 
for the lame, the sick, the old and children. The papers provide a series of thematic and 
geographic snapshots along the trajectories of these often epic journeys. They do not 
constitute the full story, but from origins in Syria, Afghanistan and Eritrea, through Turkey 
and Greece, and onward through the Western Balkans to Hungary and, for most, ultimately 
Germany, the papers provide critical analytical portrayals of some of the steps along the way.  
In the paper following this one, Heaven Crawley makes a powerful deconstruction of 
the European response to the so-called ‘migration crisis’. She first enlarges on the key point 
raised above in this introductory paper, namely that the migration crisis is not really about the 
numbers of refugees and migrants arriving on the shores of Europe over the past year and 
more, but is, rather, a crisis of political solidarity, which has been so comprehensively 
lacking. In short, it is the EU itself which is in crisis due to its failure to find a solution to a 
humanitarian and organizational challenge which, on the basis of both historical precedent 
and geographical parallels elsewhere in the world, should be manageable. Surely a European 
Community of 500 million people, mostly living in wealthy countries, can create the means 
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to accommodate 1 million refugees and migrants – or even 2 or 3 million if the flow 
continues in the next few years, as seems highly likely? That the failure to do so has been so 
palpable is due to several factors, according to Crawley. The lack of a common political will 
across the EU countries is obviously one, and this fracture between East and West within the 
EU is further analyzed in a later paper by Lulle. Other factors include a lack of regard for the 
results of research, and a failure to understand the changing nature of the forms, processes 
and routes of migration. Crawley also points out the unhelpful role of ‘cascading border 
closures’ and the way in which EU-level agreement on migration policy is repeatedly stymied 
by national governments’ apparent need to placade their respective electorates and reassure 
them that they will not be ‘overwhelmed’ by refugees and migrants ‘flooding in’ and 
claiming benefits. Instead, EU money and resources are thrown at the wider strategic issue of 
controlling the external borders of the European ‘fortress’. 
The next paper, by Jade Cemre Erciyes, focuses on the plight of the 2.5 million 
Syrians in Turkey and employs the instructive but controversial binary of ‘paradise’ vs 
purgatory’ to speculate on their current living conditions and their future life. The future is 
constructed as bi-directional – either a return to the paradise of the peace-restored Syrian 
homeland (an unlikely scenario at present) or an onward migration to the imagined paradise 
of Germany or some other North European country. Meantime, they are stuck in the 
‘purgatory’ of Turkey, where they are labeled as ‘guests’ staying in ‘temporary protection 
centers’. They have limited access to properly paid work and to education, healthcare, and 
other support systems, and suffer from discrimination and stigmatization. This is the general 
picture, but Erciyes also reports ‘good conditions’ in some refugee camps and also some 
cases of ‘well-off’ Syrians who have set up cut-price shops. 
Our next stop along the migrant trail is the Turkish-Greek border and the dangerous 
attempts to cross the relatively narrow but often stormy stretches of sea to the nearest Greek 
islands, especially Lesbos. This island-dotted maritime border at the outer edge of Europe is 
the subject of the paper by Ioanna Tsoni, who mobilizes a range of anthropological and 
geographical concepts to understand what has been going on in this maritime and insular 
‘borderscape’. Tsoni sees the migrant and refugee transit across the sometimes calm but often 
rough and dangerous stretch of sea as a ‘rite of passage’, not just from one place/country to 
another but also as a passage from one life to another. Her mobilization of the concept of 
liminality refers not just to the liminal spaces occupied and transited by the asylum-seekers 
but also as a life-stage between their traumatized recent past and an aspired-to future. But – 
and this is her key point – this liminality risks becoming a prevalent, semi-permanent state 
given the impasse that the migrants have unwittingly entered into: unable to stay, unable to 
move on, and unable to further their life ambitions, which are often simply to survive and 
have a better life. Through autoethnography and participant observation on Lesvos, the 
author is also able to examine the complex interactions between the arriving refugees, the 
local population, the ‘authorities’ and their (non-)policies, and the array of disparate 
volunteers and media personnel who congregated together on the island. 
The focus of the world’s media on the Turkey-Greece-Balkan route for Syrian and 
other Middle Eastern refugees aiming for Europe over the past year has taken attention away 
from the Central Medierranean route from Libya to Sicily – a much longer and potentially 
more hazardous sea crossing which has continued to operate, and to claim lives. The paper by 
Milena Belloni looks at this crossing from the perspective of another of the world’s major 
refugee-producing countries, Eritrea. Belloni’s paper introduces a range of interlinked actors 
into the analysis of these mostly ‘irregular’ migrant journeys and border crossings: not only 
the migrants/refugees themselves but also their family members who may (or may not) 
finance the move and the smugglers who facilitate the complex journey from Eritrea through 
Ethiopia and Sudan to Libya and then on to Italy and perhaps beyond. The result is a complex 
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‘game’ of moral pressures, risks and dilemmas, in which the migrants gamble that kinship 
and emotional solidarity on the one hand, and the fear of smugglers’ retributions on the other, 
will lead their relatives to send money despite their initial refusal to do so. Belloni shows that 
the successful migrants are those who are willing to take risks and who can mobilize 
economic resources from their transnational kinship networks by exploiting shared moralities 
and emotional capital. 
Ceri Oeppen then takes us to Afghanistan, one of the major and longest-running 
source countries for refugees applying for asylum in Europe and elsewhere. Her focus is on 
so-called ‘information campaigns’ launched by migrant- and refugee-receiving countries to 
discourage potential migrants and asylum-seekers from coming. The messages conveyed by 
such campaigns – Oeppen makes a case study of the ‘Rumours About Germany’ campaign 
launched by the German government in Afghanistan – are decidedly duplicitous. Ostensibly 
they convey a ‘realist’ message to inform would-be migrants of the physical and financial 
dangers involved, and hence purport to have a protective, even a humanitarian, function. But 
they are also, more cynically, a tool of migration control, designed to stop migrants before 
migration even occurs. And their message is not just intended for migrants; it is also an 
instrument of appeasement for the German host population, to demonstrate that ‘something is 
being done’. Even more cynically, such a campaign shifts responsibility for the risks of the 
journey onto Afghans themselves, rather than admitting that these risks derive from the 
increasingly restrictive border-control regimes of the EU. Moreover, the campaign comes at a 
time when the field research evidence shows that Afghanistan is becoming less, rather than 
more, secure. 
At the northern end of the Balkan route into Europe stands Slovenia, the subject of the 
article by Toby Applegate, who carried out field observations on the southern, Slovenian-
Croatian border and on the northern, Slovenian-Austrian border. Like most of the post-
socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Slovenia is ethnically homogenous, 
nationalistic, and neoliberal in ideology – not great credentials for dealing with the social and 
humanitarian challenges of migration and asylum. The care and transfer of refugees has 
brought into sharp relief fundamental questions about Slovenian identity and the country’s 
place in Europe, and Applegate shows how these tensions and ambiguities are played out at 
the border crossings, where landscapes and performances of control are enacted. 
Moving on to Northern Europe and the main destination country for Syrian refugees, 
Sophie Hinger examines the culture of welcome and support that characterizes the German 
reaction to the ‘refugee crisis’. Hinger shows how the celebrated Willkommenskultur, 
articulated at the European and global levels by leader Angela Merkel and resonating down 
to civil society, local support groups and individuals, was accompanied by episodes of 
xenophobic violence and protest in some towns and cities. For a time, in summer 2015 and 
beyond, Merkel’s Germany claimed the moral high ground in confronting the refugee 
emergency, opening the German border to Syrian refugees and thereby suspending the 
Schengen and Dublin Conventions. In this paper, the empirical analysis focuses on one local 
example of a welcome initiative in a typical middle-sized German city and the local 
municipality’s setting up of accommodation centers for refugees. At a broader discursive 
level, Hinger analyzes the dual framing of the recent and current refugee movements into 
Germany as both a ‘humanitarian crisis’ that needs to be responded to by collective solidarity 
and compassion, and as a ‘threat’ which requires management and control, for instance 
through policies of dispersal and ‘burden-sharing’ and the selective deportation of failed 
asylum cases. 
One important effect of EUrope’s reaction to the migration and refugee emergency has 
been to open up a geopolitical schism between what Aija Lulle calls ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe 
– respectively the pre-2014 EU15 and the eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
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countries which joined in 2014. Following Paasi (2015), Lulle utilizes the broad and multi-
layered notion of ‘independence’ to interrogate the specific neoliberal political mentality that 
has developed in the CEE region, along with a resurgence of ethno-nationalist sentiments. 
According to Lulle, the CEE countries have ‘a long and necessary journey ahead’ in terms of 
their relationship with migrants, refugees, and cultural diversity. The journey is two-pronged. 
The first challenge is to address and negotiate the reality of their own internal social, cultural 
and ethnic pluralities, which have been overlooked in their rush to join the ‘EU club’. 
Examples of these pluralities are the position of the former-Soviet-citizen russophones in the 
Baltic states, and the Roma populations of Hungary and the Czech and Slovak republics. The 
second challenge, more immediate to the theme of the special issue, is to overcome their 
seeming inability to show solidarity and empathy for the human suffering of others; it seems 
that their sharp neoliberal turn has wiped away all consciousness of their socialist past in 
favour of their inward-looking patriotic independence. 
In the final paper, Daniela DeBono challenges the notion that the return and 
deportation of irregular migrants and ‘failed’ aslyum-seekers constitutes any kind of practical 
or moral solution to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. Whilst DeBono does not question the legal 
right of states to send back ‘irregularly resident migrants’, she describes the labeling of this 
policy as a ‘solution’ to the ‘crisis’ as ‘abominable’. First, it is unethical and, second, it can 
lead states to increase the rate of returns by operating below minimum human rights 
standards. Further difficulties surround the distinction between forced repatriation and so-
called voluntary return, in which the true element of voluntariness is often debatable. 
Detailed knowledge of the effects of deportation is scarce, but that which does exist, 
including research by the author on Sweden (DeBono et al. 2015), shows that deportation 
often places deportees in a state of increased vulnerability both materially and in terms of 
their physical and psychosocial wellbeing. It is, DeBono concludes, ‘a biopolitical process of 
migration management … and embodied state violence’. 
The insights offered by the papers collected in this issue give little clue as to the end-
game. Despite repeated emergency meetings of EU leaders, there is no sustainable solution in 
sight. Both the unfolding events, and the refugees and migrants, move around, or get stuck, 
like an elaborate geopolitical and humanitarian board game in which politics, symbolism and 
hard bargaining take precedence over the lives of those on the move or halted in makeshift 
camps on islands and at borders. Pope Francis’ 16 April 2016 visit to Lesbos had 
considerable symbolic and media significance, as did his initiative in giving sanctuary to a 
few refugee families in the Vatican. But there remain thousands confined by barbed wire 
within the main detention camp on Lesbos, as well as on other Aegean islands.4 Another 
camp of 11,000 refugees-going-nowhere has emerged on the Greek-Macedonian border at 
Idomeni. Nowadays, Lesbos is no longer the theater of water-borne drama that it was in 
recent memory. Instead two other, wider processes have taken over. First, a kind of ‘grand 
bargain’ (but in reality more like a trade in the movement of bodies) has been struck between 
the EU and Turkey. Turkey receives 6 billion euros of aid to deliver humanitarian assistance 
to the 2.7 million Syrian refugees in that country, in return for Turkey’s commitment to 
control the onward flow of refugees to Greece and, perhaps more controversially, to take 
back from Greece those who are deemed irregular migrants. This ruling, which came into 
force on 20 March 2016, was greeted by protests from migrants on the Aegean islands who 
declared that ‘We’d rather die than go back to Turkey’.5 The other side of the bargain, visa 
relaxation for Turks to travel to the Schengen area, is still being hedged and the latest news 
chronicles a stand-off on this crucial issue.6 Meanwhile, the second process reactivates itself: 
as Lesbos and the Western Balkan route closes down, migrants and smugglers reactivate the 
Libyan route to Sicily and Malta as the Mediterranean waters, never fully reliable, resume 
their early-summer calmer period. 
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Notes 
 
1 This shorthand has become common in critical literature on the European Union. We 
use it here in territorial terms to distinguish the current EU28 from the far more 
territorially uncertain and culturally defined notion of ‘Europe’.  
2 The referendum which may result in ‘Brexit’ is scheduled for 23 June 2016. 
3 Regulation No. 604/2013 of 26 June 2013. 
4 See the reports by Helena Smith in the Guardian, 8 April 2016, p. 17 and the Observer, 
3 April 2016, p. 21 and 10 April 2016, p. 27. 
5 Helena Smith in the Guardian, 8 April 2016, p. 17. 
6 See Peter Kingsley’s extensive report in the Observer, 24 April 2016, p. 21. 
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